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Decision-making often involves choices between different stimuli,
each of which is associated with a different physical action. A
growing consensus suggests that the brainmakes such decisions by
assigninga value to eachavailable optionand then comparing them
to make a choice. An open question in decision neuroscience is
whether the brain computes these choices by comparing the values
of stimuli directly in goods space or instead byﬁrst assigning values
to the associated actions and thenmaking a choice over actions.We
used a functional MRI paradigm in which human subjects made
choices between different stimuli with and without knowledge of
theactions required toobtain thedifferent stimuli.We foundneural
correlates of the value of the chosen stimulus (a postdecision signal)
in ventromedial prefrontal cortex before the actual stimulus–action
pairing was revealed. These ﬁndings provide support for the hy-
pothesis that the brain is capable of making choices in the space
of goods without ﬁrst transferring values into action space.
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Imagine you are thirsty and walk up to a vending machine that isserving a variety of soft drink beverages. On the machine you
see the brand marks of the offered beverages, and because you
had previously sampled them, you easily assign values to each
drink based on their taste. To get the desired beverage, you press
the button that is distinctively associated with the preferred op-
tion. This situation exempliﬁes many of the decisions that hu-
mans and animals make in daily life. It is a well-established belief
among economists, psychologists, and neuroscientists that the
brain solves such choice problems by ﬁrst computing a value for
each alternative and then selecting the one that has the highest
value (1–4). Neuroscientists have considered two possible alter-
native ways for how values might be compared in order to make
a choice in these situations.
First is the actions-basedmodel, in which choices are embedded
in premotor processes of action selection: the values of stimuli
are passed as action values to the motor plans required to obtain
them, and the decision is then made in action space by comparing
action values (5–7). Values are learned through experience and
associated with each motor plan, and during choice a single motor
act eventually emerges through a winner-takes-all process. Al-
though this action based model of making decisions may seem
convoluted, it is in fact the predominant view among many de-
cision neuroscientists who have found value signals in areas of the
brain known to be involved in representing and planning move-
ments such as lateral parietal and premotor cortices (8–11). Fur-
ther evidence for the view that decisions are computed by a com-
parison between actions comes from the ﬁnding of action value
signals in several regions of the brain, including the caudate nu-
cleus (5, 6), supplementary motor cortex (12), and action-related
value signals in lateral intraparietal cortex (9, 13). Additionally,
the action-based model is sometimes presented as a more general
psychological model of behavior because it builds more or less
directly on theories of reinforcement learning (RL) and seems
to provide a ﬂexible and adaptable unitary model for universal
problem solving. This model has its origins in Thorndike’s law of
effect (14), describing the behavior of the animal in terms of
stimulus and motor response associations, and more recently,
several inﬂuential models of decision-making can be viewed as
variations of the action-based model (15, 16).
Second is the goods-based model, in which the values of the
available stimuli are compared directly to make a choice without
taking into account any action information (i.e., the choice takes
place in goods space), and only after a stimulus is chosen are the
necessary motor plans identiﬁed and executed (17, 18). This view
proposes a sequential choice process in which action selection is
temporally separated from the actual process of choice. There is
evidence consistent with the presence of abstract goods-based
value representations in orbitofrontal cortex (17, 19–22), which
could be used as the input to such a choice process. Further-
more, lesion studies indicate double dissociations between the
effects of lesions of orbitofrontal cortex and anterior cingulate
cortex on learning of stimulus-reward and action-reward asso-
ciations, respectively (23, 24).
Note, however, that although there is considerable evidence
for goal values and stimulus-based learning, it is as yet unknown
whether such signals are used to compute choices directly, or
whether by contrast such signals need to be converted into action
space before choice signals can be computed.
The aim of the present study was to directly address this
question. We used functional MRI (fMRI) in human subjects
while they performed a variant of a two-armed bandit task to
obtain probabilistically delivered monetary rewards (Fig. 1A). In
every trial, subjects made a choice between two stimuli and se-
lected one by executing the action that was randomly paired with
the chosen stimulus (either button press or saccade). A critical
feature of the task was that, in half of the trials [stimulus con-
dition (SC)], subjects were ﬁrst presented with the two stimuli
alone in a horizontal arrangement that did not contain any in-
formation about the actions required to obtain them. The actions
were revealed only after a variable interval by randomly ﬂipping
the stimuli in vertical alignment. At this stage, subjects could
choose the upper stimulus by making a saccade to a target in the
right hemiﬁeld, and the lower stimulus by pressing a button with
their right hand. In the other half of the trials [action condition
(AC)], the ﬁrst screen was not shown and instead the stimuli
appeared immediately in the vertical action-pairing position. To
avert the possibility that subjects made the decision in the pre-
ceding intertrial interval, they were, in every trial, presented with
a choice between two of three possible stimuli (triangle, square,
and circle) in pseudorandom appearance. Subjects therefore did
not know until the trial onset which pair of stimuli would be
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presented. The probability of being rewarded on selecting each
of the three stimuli drifted randomly over time and was in-
dependent of the probability of being rewarded on the others
(Fig. 1B). We estimated the value of taking each stimulus in
every trial by calculating the stimulus values using a computa-
tional RL model in which the values Vtriangle, Vsquare, and Vcircle
were updated in proportion to a prediction error on each trial.
The model also assumed that stimulus selection in every trial
followed a soft-max probability rule based on the difference of
the estimated values, which provided a good description of be-
havior (Fig. 1C, Fig. S1, and Table S1).
We reasoned that, if choices can be computed in goods space,
we should observe neural correlates of the chosen value, a post-
decision signal, already at the time of stimulus presentation.
Note that the prediction was that these chosen value signals
would be observed before any action-related information was
made available to the subjects, thus making it unlikely that they
would be able to process the choice in the motor system. Based
on several previous fMRI studies, we expected to see a neuronal
representation of the chosen value in ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC) (12, 25, 26). If our hypothesis is correct, it will
provide unique evidence that the brain can compute choices
solely in goods space. We also speculated that subjects would
respond faster in SC trials than in AC trials because the time
necessary to make a decision between the desired stimuli had
already been provided before the action pairing.
Results
Response Times. Consistent with the reaction time hypothesis, we
found that subjects responded signiﬁcantly faster (paired t test,
P < 10−11) in the SC than the AC condition (Fig. 1D).
Neural Correlates of Chosen Values.To look for neural correlates of
value signals we entered the trial-by-trial estimates of the values
of the two stimuli under consideration into a regression analysis
against the fMRI data. We found that, in SC trials, neural ac-
tivity in vmPFC (x = −3, y = 27, z = −9; T = 3.54) correlated
with the value of the stimulus that is subsequently chosen before
the stimulus–action pairing was revealed (Fig. 2A and Table S2).
We also tested for a value-chosen signal in SC trials at the time
of action pairing but did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant correlation for
this contrast at our omnibus threshold. In AC trials, the vmPFC
(x = −6, y = 39, z = −12; T = 5.74) also correlated signiﬁcantly
with the value-chosen signal. Although the peak of the area
encoding the chosen value in AC trials was found to be located
slightly more anterior and ventral than the peak in SC trials (Fig.
2A and Table S3), a further interaction contrast showed that no
area correlated with chosen value more strongly in either the SC
or AC condition, even at a liberal threshold of P < 0.005 (un-
corrected). Effect size plots (Fig. 2B) and time course plots (Fig.
2C) in the overlapping area (center at x = −9, y = 42, z = −3)
conﬁrmed that, in SC trials, activity in vmPFC was correlated
with the chosen value only at the time of stimulus presentation
but not at the succeeding time of stimulus–action pairing. Time
courses separated according to the value signal in SC trials al-
ready at the time of the stimulus presentation, which preceded
the action-pairing screen by 3 to 5 s. All reported activations are
signiﬁcant after family wise error correction for multiple com-
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Fig. 1. Experimental design and behavior. (A) Subjects were presented with
two stimuli (in every trial pseudorandomly selected among three possible
stimuli) in horizontal arrangement (screen 1, for a variable time between 3
and 5 s). Stimuli then ﬂipped to a vertical arrangement indicating the actions
required to obtain each stimulus (making a saccade or pressing a button,
screen 2). When a response had been registered, the screen was immediately
cleared for a short delay and subsequently the outcome was revealed (screen
4 at 6 s after screen 2), indicating receipt of reward or no reward. There were
two conditions: an SC as just described and an AC in which the ﬁrst screen
was not shown and subjects immediately saw the stimulus–action pairing.
Red, green, and cyan arrows indicate onset times for regressors used to es-
timate the effects reported in Figs. 2 and 3 (which are illustrated using the
same color code). (B) Example reward probability paths for the three stimuli
as a function of the trial number. The probabilities of being rewarded fol-
lowing choice ﬂuctuated slowly and independently for each stimulus across
the experiment. (C) Actual choice probability plotted against ﬁtted model
choice probability (binned 0.1 wide), averaged across subjects (lines repre-
sent SEM). (D) Reaction time (after the action pairing is revealed in screen 2)
is signiﬁcantly lower in SC trials than in AC trials (paired t test, P < 10−11,
vertical lines represent SEM).
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Fig. 2. Neural correlates of chosen value. (A) Activity in vmPFC showed
signiﬁcant correlation with the value of the stimulus that was subsequently
chosen before the stimulus–action pairing was revealed (SC trials, red). The
value chosen signal in AC trials was represented slightly more ventrally
(green). Voxels overlapping in both contrasts are shown in yellow. Activa-
tions survive correction for multiple comparisons as described in Methods.
(B) A comparison of effect size at the overlapping region conﬁrms that, in SC
trials, the value chosen is represented only at the time of the stimulus screen
(red) but not at the time of the following stimulus–action pairing (cyan). In
AC trials, the value chosen is represented at the coinciding stimulus/action
screen (green). Bars indicate SEM. (C) Event-related blood oxygen level-
dependent responses in SC trials time locked to the stimulus presentation
(Left), the stimulus–action pairing (Center), and in AC trials time locked to
the coinciding stimulus–action pairing (Right). Time courses are plotted
separately for trials in which the chosen values were small (dashed, V < 0.5)
and large (solid, V > 0.5). Note that, consistent with the effect sizes shown in
B, time courses split in SC trials after stimulus presentation (Ts, Left) but
already approximately 4 s before the action pairing (Ta, Center). Dashed
lines represent SEM.
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parisons at the cluster level. Data used to calculate effect sizes
were independent of the data used in the functional deﬁnition of
the region of interest.
An important concern with this result is that the identiﬁed
correlations with the chosen value signals might reﬂect the
encoding of other prechoice signals that correlate with the chosen
value signal. One variable of special concern is the average stim-
ulus value, which is positively correlated with the chosen value.
We addressed this concern in two ways. First, we ran a separate
generalized linear model (GLM) in which activity at the time of
stimulus evaluation in SC trials was modulated by the average
stimulus value and by the chosen value. Importantly, to avoid any
spurious correlation, the chosen value modulator was orthogo-
nalized with respect to the average stimulus value signal. The
activation in this contrast was observed at the same cluster as in
the original design (peak, −9, 33, −3; T = 2.95; P < 0.004), in-
dicating that the chosen value signal accounts for variance in
vmPFC activity over and above that accounted for by stimulus
value. Second, we compared the signals from value chosen with
both the average stimulus values and the maximum stimulus val-
ues within vmPFC to determine the relative probability with which
these signals explain the measured neural signal in every subject.
We used a Bayesian model comparison approach (27) to calculate
posterior model probabilities and compared the likelihoods of
the three value signals. The advantage of this method is that it
circumvents any collinearity issues occurring from correlated
regressors in the GLM. Consistent with our previous results, we
found that, out of the three value signals, value chosen was the
most likely underlying explanatory variable for activity in a cluster
in vmPFC (−3, 27, −9). Using the Bayesian method, we compared
all three value signals simultaneously as well as pair-wise chosen
value with average stimulus value and maximum stimulus value.
The exceedance probability in this analysis reﬂects the likelihood
that one model explains the neural data better than the other
models in the comparison (Table S4). The exceedance probability
of the value chosen model is larger than 95% in both of our
pairwise comparisons. Note that the sum of the stimulus values is
identical to the average stimulus value after mean correction, and
a comparison of value chosen with the sum of stimulus values
would yield the same outcome. To further rule out the possibility
that the activation is merely stemming from an unequal repre-
sentation of the two options in vmPFC before choice, we also
directly compared the value of the chosen option to the value of
the option not chosen in a separate analysis. If the activation in the
vmpFC cluster were caused by some form of representation of
both value options, we would see in this contrast some variance
loading on both regressors. We found signiﬁcant activation for
value chosen (peak at−3, 27,−12; T=3.89; P< 0.0005) similar to
our original design, but no brain areas correlating signiﬁcantly
with the value of the unchosen option at a liberal threshold of P <
0.005 uncorrected. We also tested for the difference between
value chosen and the value not chosen at the contrast level and did
not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant correlation at P < 0.005 (uncorrected).
Neural Correlates of Stimulus Values. We then looked for repre-
sentations of the individual stimulus values, because clearly such
signals should be a precursor of choice in that these values need
to be compared in order to work out which option is ultimately
chosen. In view of the spatial limitations of fMRI, we assumed it
would be unlikely to detect activity patterns encoding the value
of the individual stimuli. Instead, we assumed that neurons en-
coding such values would be spatially intermixed within the same
region, and that such intermixed neural signals would be re-
ﬂected at the level of the blood oxygen level-dependent signal as
an average of the values of the two stimuli under consideration
on a given trial. Consistent with our hypothesis, we found such an
averaged stimulus value signal in SC trials within a subregion of
vmPFC (x = −9, y = 48, z = −3; T = 4.41; Fig. 3 and Table S5).
We also performed an analogous Bayesian model comparison
for pre- and postdecision values at this vmPFC location, and
activity in this subcluster was explained best by the average
stimulus value (Table S4). Furthermore, consistent with the
notion that individual stimulus values are only required at the
time of decision-making, we found evidence for an averaged
stimulus value signal only at the time of stimulus presentation
(and not after the action pairings had been presented).
Neural Correlates of Action. A natural question is whether action
values are still computed after a choice is made in goods space in
the SC condition, and if they are computed in the AC condition.
To pursue the possibility that stimulus values are still transferred
to the motor system for action selection, we looked for neural
representations of action value signals (5, 12, 28). We did not
ﬁnd any area correlating with the value of eye or hand move-
ments in either SC or AC conditions at a liberal threshold of P <
0.005 (uncorrected).
Discussion
Our results show that there is activity in vmPFC that correlates
with the value of the stimulus that is chosen in a trial, a post-
decision signal, before the action pairing was revealed. Because
there exists no other way to represent the value of the option that
will eventually be selected in a trial without prior value com-
parison that converged to this particular option, these ﬁndings
provide support for the hypothesis that the brain is capable of
computing choices completely within an abstract representation
of stimuli.
One possible alternative explanation of our ﬁndings is that, in
the SC, subjects make decisions by assigning temporary action
pairings to the stimuli before the action pairings are revealed,
and then compare the temporary actions. These temporary ac-
tion pairings could then be substituted for the real action
assignments at the time of action presentation. Although we
cannot completely rule out these explanations on the basis of our
data alone, there are several reasons why this type of explanation
is unlikely to account for our results. First, when subjects are in
a situation in which it is necessary to make decisions over actions
(i.e., when there is no unique stimulus information to discrimi-
nate different options), regions of the brain known to be involved
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Fig. 3. Neural correlates of stimulus value. (A) Activity in vmPFC showed
signiﬁcant correlation with the average value of the two stimuli that were
presented in SC trials at the time of screen 1 (red). Activations survive cor-
rection for multiple comparisons as described inMethods. (B) Comparison of
effect sizes at the peak region between conditions. Neural activity in this
region correlated with stimulus values in SC trials but not in AC trials. Bars
indicate SEM.
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in motor planning and initiation such as supplementary motor
cortex, lateral intraparietal cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex
have been found to contain action-related value signals in earlier
imaging studies (12, 29). However, these regions did not show
signiﬁcant correlations with action value signals in the present
paradigm even at a liberal uncorrected threshold (P < 0.005),
suggesting that neural systems involved in action representations
were not directly engaged during the decision process in the
present study. Second, on a more conceptual level, although
encoding of conditional action pairings might be feasible in the
present simpliﬁed experimental paradigm, such a mechanism is
unlikely to scale well in many real-world decision problems with
large numbers of sequential conditional action pairings, because
decisions in such contexts would require encoding of long strings
of conditional action pairings that could rapidly become compu-
tationally intractable. By contrast, the parsimonious alternative
pro-posed here, whereby in such contexts a decision is made be-
tween the stimuli, would not suffer from the same scaling problem.
We did not ﬁnd action value signals (5, 12, 28) in the SC or AC
conditions even at liberal thresholds. A possible explanation for
the lack of action value signals could be that, in contrast to
previous paradigms, in the current study subjects did not have to
keep track of action values over trials and doing so would have
not improved performance. Although a negative ﬁnding should
not be interpreted as deﬁnitive evidence against the presence of
action values, it supports the idea that, in this particular task, the
choices were being implemented in goods space in both the SC
and AC conditions.
Interestingly, we found a representation of the stimulus values
only in the SC but not in the AC condition. Although we cannot
rule out the possibility that subjects indeed compute choices
differently in the two conditions, it is conceivable that the stim-
ulus value signals are very transiently represented only while the
options are under consideration. Whereas in SC trials, the
stimuli screen is shown for 3 to 5 s during which subjects could
consider the options, they are allowed an immediate response in
AC trials, allowing the value comparison process to reach con-
vergence very quickly. With respect to recent hypotheses that
ventromedial frontal cortex might be comparing the values of
possible choices, discarding the representation of the unchosen
option and maintaining the representation of the chosen one (30,
31), it would be interesting to know whether the stimulus values in
the ventromedial frontal cortex temporally precede the presence
of a signal related to the value of the chosen stimulus in the ad-
jacent ventromedial frontal cortical region. Although the tem-
poral resolution of fMRI makes it very challenging to answer this
question, other techniques such as EEG or single-unit neuro-
physiology could be deployed in the future to resolve this issue.
It is important to emphasize that our data do not imply that
all decisions are made in goods space, but rather that the brain
is capable of computing a decision purely in goods space when
action pairings are not available. There is ample experimental
evidence that behavioral decisions can be and are made over
actions in many contexts (12, 29, 32–35). Given the results
presented here and taken alongside evidence for the presence
of action value signals in caudate (5, 6) and supplementary
motor system (12), it is natural to conjecture that both mech-
anisms may coexist during certain types of choices. In fact, this
is proposed in some associative models of goal-directed be-
havior, which posit that choice can occur over outcomes that
then subsequently retrieve actions, or over actions that sub-
sequently retrieve outcomes (36, 37).
Methods
Subjects. A total of 24 healthy subjects [age 18–31 y; all right-handed as
assessed by self-report with an adapted version of the Edinburgh handed-
ness inventory (38)] with no history of neurological or psychiatric illness
participated in the study. The study was approved by the Institutional Re-
view Panel of the California Institute of Technology.
Task. The task is a variant of a two-armed bandit problem in which subjects
make pair-wise choices between subsets of two stimuli that were pseudor-
andomly selected among three stimuli used in the experiment: a green tri-
angle, a blue square, and a yellow circle.
There were two conditions presented pseudorandomly intermixed during
the experiment. In the ﬁrst one (SC), subjects were initially presentedwith the
stimuli in horizontal arrangement without the information of what action
they had to perform to choose a stimulus. After a variable time (3, 4, or 5 s,
uniform distribution), the stimuli ﬂipped to vertical position that indicated
the action associated with each stimulus. The assignment of stimuli to actions
was made randomly in every trial. At this stage, subjects could press a button
with their right index ﬁnger to choose the bottom stimulus or perform
a saccade from a central ﬁxation cross to a target located at 10° of visual
angle in the right hemiﬁeld to choose the top stimulus.
In the second condition (AC), the trials were identical except that the ﬁrst
screen was not shown and subjects were immediately presented with the
stimuli in vertical arrangement at the beginning of the trial.
The probability (Qi,t) of stimulus i being rewarded in trial t evolved over
time as a decaying Gaussian random walk process, with Qi,t + 1 = max{0, min
[1,λ Qi,t + (1 − λ)θ + ν]}, where the decay parameter λ was 0.8, the decay
center θ was 0.50, and the diffusion noise ν was zero-mean Gaussian with an
SD σ of 0.2. Two different probability trajectories were generated by using
this method and were assigned across subjects randomly. Fig. 1B depicts one
of the probability paths used in the experiment. An important feature of this
design is that the probability of being rewarded on one of the three stimuli
is independent of the probability of being rewarded on the others. This
feature is useful because it implies that the RL-based estimates of the
stimulus values are uncorrelated with each other, which increases our ability
to dissociate the neural correlates.
The task consisted of four sessions of 75 trials each, separated by a short
break. Subjects had to select an actionwithin 2.5 s after onset of the stimulus–
action pairing screen; otherwise the trial was counted as an invalid missed
trial. Subjects very rarely failed to make a response within this time window:
none of the subjects had more than two such events during the entire ex-
periment, and most subjects did not miss any trials at all. After the response
was registered, the screen changed to a ﬁxation cross until 6 s after trial
onset. At this time the outcome was displayed for 1 s by showing an image
of a dollar bill in rewarded trials or a scrambled dollar bill in nonrewarded
trials. Trials were separated by a ﬁxation cross that lasted between 1 and 8 s
(uniform distribution).
Before the experiment, subjects received full instructions about the task
and the two conditions, they were informed that the probabilities of being
rewarded on each stimulus changed as a continuous function over time (but
were not given details about the underlying stochastic process), and they
were instructed to try tomaximize their earnings, which were paid to them at
the end of the experiment. Subjects accumulated $0.25 in each rewarded
trial. We did not reveal the exact reward per trial to subjects before the
experiment but instead instructed them only that they will get a small
amount of money for each rewarded trial. At the end of the experiment
subjects were paid their accumulated earnings in addition to a ﬂat amount
of $20.
The task was presented to the subjects via back projection on a translucent
screen, viewable through a head coil–mounted mirror. Subjects chose the
hand action by pressing a button on a button box with their right index
ﬁnger. Eye positions were monitored at 120 Hz with a long-range infrared
eye-tracking device (ASL Model L6 with control unit ASL 6000; Applied Sci-
ence Laboratories). An eye action during the choice period was registered
when the median horizontal eye coordinate during the past 200 ms excee-
ded 8° of visual angle to the right from ﬁxation. Subjects were instructed to
maintain central ﬁxation during the entire experiment when not deliber-
ately making a saccade.
RL Model. RL is concerned with learning values in different states of the
world in a model-free environment in which subjects do not have complete
knowledge about the underlying reward generating process. Thus, it is ideally
suited to model how subjects learned the value of choosing the different
stimuli over time.
In this study, we used RL learning, whereby stimulus values are updated
using a simple Rescorla-Wagner rule. If a stimulus is not selected in a trial its
value is not updated. In contrast, if stimuli S1 and S2 are shown and S1 is
selected on trial t, its value is updated via a prediction error, δ, as follows:
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Vs1ðtþ 1Þ ¼ Vs1ðtÞ þ ηδðtÞ; [1]
where η is a learning rate between 0 and 1. The prediction error is given by
δðtÞ ¼ rðtÞ−Vs1ðtÞ. The delivered probabilistic rewards were used in updat-
ing value predictions of S1 in the RL model. The value of the stimulus that
was not chosen (S2) or not presented in a trial (S3), i.e., those stimuli on
which subjects did not receive feedback, were allowed to decay toward the
mean (13) and updated as follows:
Vs2=3

tþ 1 ¼ Vs2=3

t

− τ

Vs2=3

t

− 0:5

; [2]
where the parameter τ is the decay rate, accounting for possible forgetting
of past experiences (leaky integration). To generate choices, we ﬁrst used
a soft-max procedure in which, in every trial, the probability (P) of choosing
stimulus s1 is given by the following:
Ps1;t ¼ σ

β

Vs1

t

−Vs2

t

− α

[3]
where σðzÞ ¼ 1=ð1þ e− zÞ is the Luce choice rule or logistic sigmoid, α =
0 denotes the indecision point (at which both actions are selected with
equal probability), and β determines the degree of stochasticity involved
in making decisions.
The model decision probabilities Ps1 and Ps2 were ﬁtted against the dis-
crete behavioral data Bs1 and Bs2 to estimate the free parameters (η, β, and τ).
This was done using maximum likelihood estimation subject by subject. The
associated likelihood function is given by
logL ¼ ΣBs1logPs1
Ns1
þ ΣBs2logPs2
Ns2
; [4]
where Ns1 and Ns2 denote, respectively, the number of trials in which S1 and
S2 were chosen, and Bs1 (Bs2) equals 1 if S1 (S2) was chosen in that trial, and
0 otherwise. We ﬁtted this function similarly for the other two stimulus
combinations (S1/S3 and S2/S3) and found the optimal parameters by mini-
mizing the sum of the three negative log-likelihoods.
We compared the choice probabilities predicted by the RL model using the
soft-max procedure to subjects’ behavior by binning P into 10 bins (bin size
of 0.1) and calculating for each bin the fraction of trials in which subjects
chose one stimulus. For this test we pooled data from the three sigmoid
choice probability functions. To test the ﬁt between the model and the
behavioral data, we performed a linear regression, subject by subject, of the
fraction of choices on the binned choice probability versus the predicted bin.
Overall, the regression results suggest that the model captures actual action
value estimation and choice behavior well: on average, the model could
explain 92% of the variance in the actual choice data (based on R2; Fig. 1C,
Fig. S1, and Table S1). We also tested for any structure in the residuals of the
regression by looking at the autocorrelations, as any serial correlation in the
residuals would mean that there is room for improvement in the model. We
have no evidence for such a violation of independence in our data. For every
individual subject, the autocorrelations at all possible lags were inside the
95% CI for a stochastic process.
fMRI Data Acquisition. Data were acquired with a 3-T scanner (Trio; Siemens)
using an eight-channel phased-array head coil. Functional images were taken
with a gradient-echo T2*-weighted echo-planar sequence (repetition time,
2.65 s; ﬂip angle, 90°; echo time, 30 ms; 64 × 64 matrix). Whole brain cov-
erage was achieved by taking 45 slices (3 mm thickness, no gap, in-plane
resolution 3 × 3 mm), tilted in an oblique orientation at 30° to the anterior
commissure/posterior commissure line to minimize signal dropout in the
orbitofrontal cortex. Subjects’ heads were restrained with foam pads to limit
head movement during acquisition. Functional imaging data were acquired
in four separate 370-volume runs, each lasting approximately 16 min. A high-
resolution T1-weighted anatomical scan of the whole brain (magnetization-
prepared rapid acquisition with gradient echo sequence, 1 × 1 × 1 mm res-
olution) was also acquired for each subject.
fMRI Data Analysis. Image analysis was performed using SPM5 (Institute of
Neurology, Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, United
Kingdom). Images were ﬁrst slice time corrected to TR/2, realigned to the ﬁrst
volume to correct for subject motion, spatially normalized to a standard T2*
template with a voxel size of 3 mm, and spatially smoothed with a Gaussian
kernel of 8 mm full-width at half-maximum. Intensity normalization and
high-pass temporal ﬁltering (using a ﬁlter width of 128 s) were also applied
to the data.
First, we estimated a GLM with AR(1) for each individual subject. The
following events were modeled in each trial: (i) The time of the stimulus
presentation in SC trials, parametrically modulated by the trial-by-trial
stimulus values Vs1 and Vs2; (ii) the time of the stimulus-action pairing in SC
trials, parametrically modulated by the trial-by-trial stimulus values Vs1 and
Vs2; (iii) the time of the stimulus–action pairing in AC trials, parametrically
modulated by the trial-by-trial stimulus values Vs1 and Vs2; and (iv) the time
of the presentation of the outcome, modulated by the prediction error δ and
a binary function encoding whether a reward was given. Trials in which
subjects chose the eye action and trials in which subjects chose the hand
action were modeled in separate regressors. All regressors were convolved
with the canonical hemodynamic response function. In addition, the six scan-
to-scan motion parameters produced during realignment and session con-
stants were included as additional regressors of no interest.
Second, we computed contrasts of interest at the individual level using
linear combinations of the regressors described earlier. Finally, to enable
inference at the group level, we calculated second-level group contrasts using
one-sample t tests.
In addition to the GLM described earlier, we estimated four additional
GLMs, which were in most parts identical to the ﬁrst GLM except for the
following difference in parametric modulation: at the time of stimulus
presentation in SC condition, the ﬁrst parametric modulator was (i) the sum
of both stimulus values, (ii) the maximum of the stimulus values, (iii) the
difference of the stimulus values, and (iv) the value of the option not chosen.
The second parametric modulator was the value of the stimulus that was
later chosen in the trial. This second value chosen modulator was orthogo-
nalized toward the stimulus value parameter. By doing this, we assured that
any shared variance between value chosen and stimulus value was assigned
to the stimulus value regressor. Therefore, any remaining variance captured
by the value chosen regressor does not contain any confound from the
stimulus value signal.
We used a Bayesian model comparison procedure (27) to determine which
value signal (value chosen or stimulus value) better explained the neural
activity in vmPFC. The details of this method are described in SI Methods.
Statistics were corrected for multiple comparisons by using a family wise
error correction. For this we set a height threshold (at P < 0.005) in combi-
nation with an extent threshold based on the number of contiguous voxels
located in a cluster (39). We used AlphaSim in the Analysis of Functional
NeuroImages open source to run a Monte Carlo simulation to determine the
probability of contiguous cluster formations under the null hypothesis at the
height threshold speciﬁed (40). AlphaSim generates an estimate of overall
cluster size signiﬁcance level by iteration of the process of random image
generation, Gaussian ﬁltering to simulate voxel smoothness, thresholding,
image masking, and tabulation of cluster size frequencies. In our simulation
we generated a series of 10,000 random images, each having 56,401 spa-
tially uncorrelated voxels (the number of voxels in masked EPI images) by
ﬁlling the masked brain volume with independent normal random numbers.
The effect of voxel correlation was simulated by convolving the random
image with a Gaussian function of the size of our smoothing kernel (8 mm
full-width at half-maximum). The image was then scaled to provide the in-
dividual voxel probability threshold pthr of 0.005 by determining the value
zthr such that approximately pthr*N voxels have intensity greater than zthr.
The thresholding was then accomplished by setting those voxels with in-
tensity greater zthr to 1 (activated voxels), voxels with intensity less than zthr
to 0. Finally, AlphaSim determined which activated voxels belonged to
which clusters. When all clusters had been found, the size of each cluster in
voxels was recorded in a frequency table. This simulation estimated that, in
our volume of the entire brain, a cluster size of more than 51 contiguous
activated voxels (with each individual voxel surviving a P < 0.005 threshold;
height threshold) would occur by chance with a probability of less than 0.05
(cluster extent threshold).
The effect size/time course plots in Figs. 2 B and C and 3B were computed
by averaging the GLM’s β values/time course data across subjects. To ensure
the independence of the data that we analyzed within a region of interest
(effect sizes and Bayesian model comparison) from the data used to select
regions of interest, we performed the following leave-one-out analysis. First,
we looped through all subjects and computed group averages for all but one
subject. We then extracted the data within a region centered at the leave-
one-out group peak voxel of the subject that was excluded in this group.
The structural T1 images were coregistered to the mean functional EPI
images for each subject and normalized using the parameters derived from
the EPI images. Anatomical localization was carried out by overlaying the
t-maps on a normalized structural image averaged across subjects, and with
reference to an anatomical atlas (41).
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